

**Understanding Brexit: Brexiters' Nationalism and Euroscepticism vs.
Remainers' Resistance and Pro-Europeanism**

**Crina-Oana Gociu
Nadia-Nicoleta Morărașu
Mihaela Culea
"Vasile Alecsandri" University of Bacău
Romania**

Abstract

This article attempts to prove that the sense of English identity and English nationalism were two key factors in the UK's decision to withdraw from the European Union and indicates the evolution of the Eurosceptic attitude in the UK to the point at which UK's citizens were divided by the referendum in 2016 into two categories: Brexiters and Remainers.

In adopting a socio-cultural perspective, it provides an empirical analysis of a survey made in 2012 by the *Future of England* regarding English nationalism and the way such attitudes as Euroscepticism, Britishness or Englishness affected the results of the 2016 EU referendum in the UK. It starts with the main features of nationalism in UK's component countries (Black 2021) and ends with a few personal conclusions regarding the way the Eurosceptic attitude was used by the Brexiters' campaign in order to achieve its purpose.

Keywords: *national identity, Englishness, Britishness, Euroscepticism, Brexiters, Remainers.*

1. The Question of Nationalism

Nationalism is a complex concept emerging from the idea that the human society is divided into distinct groups. A nation is a group of people speaking a common language and sharing beliefs and a common past. Sometimes, religion also helps to unite people and define a nation. Nationalism is the term which describes the connections, the bonds which keep people united as a community.

Nationalism unites people in a way that is neither genetic, nor biological; it is not even based on even having a personal connection with other members of the same nation. It is not enough just to have a common government to make a nation – we must have shared cultural symbols like flags, national anthems, a shared idea of the history of our nations to create and build a community of a nation.

The nationalist idea of a community resonates with many of humanity's deepest instincts and needs for survival, security, protection and safety; for the fulfilment of practical economic and other needs; and for belonging, particularly to stable, coherent, meaningful, special and distinctive groups.

In England, nationalism first manifested in the 17th century, as a consequence of the Puritan Revolution. England was a very important economic and political power in Europe and this is one of the reasons that determined the English people feel that they had the duty to fight for liberty and lead the nation towards a new era of reformation and optimist humanism. At the time, the English people were compared to Ancient Israel. Yet the feeling of belonging to one nation was not idealised unanimously by scholars and scientists, regardless the age, the country, or the language in which they had written.

In a speech addressed by Albert Einstein to the German League of Human Rights in the autumn of 1932 which appears in the Appendix of White and Gribbon (p. 262), Albert Einstein metaphorically defined the concept of nationalism as *the measles of mankind*. It is a very controversial opinion, and we should also mention the context in which he expressed it. He was talking about the Nazi Party in Germany and

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its terror; and yet, we should think of the impact that huge waves of nationalist movements have had upon countries and people in the past.

1.1. Nationalism in U.K.

Nationalism in Britain was not born as a result of a revolution which could have led to the formation of the nation-state; therefore, it is not very much alike the rest of the European countries and the respective types of nationalisms.

Among all the scholars who approached this issue, the historian Adrian Hastings (1997) wrote in *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* that "one can find historians to date 'the dawn of English national consciousness in almost every century from the eighth to the nineteenth'".

In the UK, nationalism emerged and developed within each component country in different ways, being the result of many intertwined factors: starting with the people, their culture, and their beliefs and ending with the past's spiritual heritage and the geographical position of each respective country in the UK. The chart below (Figure 1) a representation of the concept of nationalism and its particularities distributed geographically.

TYPE	SCOTLAND	WALES	NI-1 UNIONIST	NI-2 IRISH-NAT	ENGLAND	BRITAIN
CIVIC	✓					✓
EXPANSIONARY				✓		
CULTURAL/LANGUAGE	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
REVOLUTIONARY				✓		
POST-COLONIAL			?	✓		
RELIGION				✓		
SHARED HISTORY	✓	✓				
NAT-PRIDE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ETHNICITY				✓	✓	✓
ECONOMICS	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	

Figure 1. The Main features of Nationalism in U.K.'s component countries (Black 2021)

Thus, nationalism in UK has different characteristics developed more or less in each side of UK. For example, English nationalism is built upon concepts such as: culture and language, national pride, ethnicity and economics.

According to Figure 1, the UK constituent nations embrace different types of nationalism, based on different fundamental ideologies. There are eleven features of nationalism revealed in chart 1: civic nationalism, expansionary nationalism, cultural nationalism, revolutionary nationalism, post-colonial nationalism, nationalism based on religious matters, nationalism focusing on a shared history, the Nat-pride nationalism, which is strictly connected with some of the features already above, ethnic nationalism and nationalism based on economic matters. Some of them are somehow interconnected or intertwined, while others are clearly distinctive. In each component country, nationalism has different features which are marked by ticks in the chart above.

The promise of returned sovereignty was used by the British government, to some extent, to keep Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales in the union. All three have long held various powers of their own, but the process of “devolution” gathered speed in the late 1990s with the creation of legislative assemblies in Scotland (otherwise known as Holyrood), Northern Ireland (Stormont), and Wales (Senedd).

The main feature of the Scottish nationalism is its civic form, being often referred to as the so-called “inclusive nationalism, a non-ethnic nationalism where all are welcome to join and participate in the civic life”. Yet, it is important to mention the fact that the Scottish people had already been asked to vote in a referendum in 2014, before the EU referendum in UK. When asked whether Scotland should be an independent country or not, the “no” side had won. After three years since the vote to leave the European Union, Scotland’s independence movement, which was stymied by the failed referendum in 2014, has resurfaced. Calls for a similar poll in Northern Ireland, which would raise the prospect of reunification with the Republic of Ireland, have grown. Even in Wales – which, unlike Scotland and Northern Ireland, favoured leaving the EU – the nationalist sentiment appears to be

increasing. As far as Irish nationalism is concerned, there has been much tension and violence between the Unionist and the Republican group until the Good Friday Agreement was signed.

Finally, the distinction between English and British nationalism is required. The concept of English nationalism refers to a nationalism that claims that the English are a nation and promote the cultural identity and unity of the English people. Broadly speaking, it embodies all the social movements and the feelings emerged out of love for the English culture, language, history and a sense of pride in England and the English people.

I.2. Nationalism in England

England is a place name that is sometimes wrongly used in reference to the whole United Kingdom, the entire island of Great Britain, or indeed the British Isles. Nearly 84% of the population of the UK lives in England, mainly in the major cities and metropolitan areas.

The English national identity is very enigmatic and elusive because, unlike the Scots, Welsh and Irish, the English find it difficult to say who they are. Kumar (2006) studies the rise of English nationalism in his work "The Making of English National Identity." He considers that the past of the English as an imperial people developed a sense of "missionary nationalism", comparing the English with the Russians and the Austrians. The English took pride as empire-builders and could not see themselves as just another nation in the world. Krishan (2006: 2) argues that "it is not until the late nineteenth century, at the earliest, that we find a clear concern with questions of 'Englishness' and English national identity".

According to Bagehot (2021), in *The Economist*, "English nationalism is the most disruptive force in British politics."¹ English nationalists are reticent to immigration and immigrants, being often described as xenophobic, which explains why they were also strong Leave supporters (Brexiters).

¹ Bagehot, S., *The Disruptive Rise of English Nationalism. A Radical New Force Is Reshaping the Country*, in *The Economist*, March 20th 2021, available at <https://www.economist.com/britain/2021/03/20/the-disruptive-rise-of-english-nationalism>, accessed on the 18th of February 2022, at 15:21.

Bagehot (2021) wrote in *The Economist* that the very meaning of “Englishness” is changing before our eyes”. English sense of national identity may have started developing as far back as Anglo-Saxon times, as some historians claim, and yet, today’s English nationalism is a “very different beast” from the classic variety that George Orwell celebrated in “England, Your England” in 1941. It seems as if, through the 2016 referendum, the English tried to prove who they really are, that they still count, that they can still make a difference in Europe.

2. U.K. in the EU

2.1. The United Kingdom as a EU Member

Sassatelli (2009), in *Becoming Europeans. Cultural Identities and Cultural Policies*, identifies the three fundamental sources of the European idea and the main components of what has become a consolidated canon by quoting Valéry’s view:

true European, a man in whom the European mind can come to its full realization. Wherever the names of Caesar, Caius, Trajan and Virgil, of Moses and St. Paul, and of Aristotle, Plato, and Euclid have had simultaneous meaning and authority, there is Europe. Every race and land that has been successively Romanized, Christianized, and as regards the mind, disciplined by the Greeks, is absolutely European. (Valéry, quoted in Rougemont 1961: 335).

W. Churchill considered that UK was “a sponsor and friend” for the other members of the European community. Obviously, a friend or a sponsor is not the same thing as a member. “With Europe, but not of it” (not part of it), as Roberts wrote in *The Spectator*, in 2018.

Trying to understand the changes that have occurred in the U.K. in the last decade involves also understanding the distinct circumstances in which the U.K. joined the European Union in the first place. In “Clean Brexit: Why leaving the EU still make sense Building a post Brexit economy for all”, The starting point of what we call today the European Union was the reunion of

the leading political figures from Belgium, Luxemburg, France, West Germany, Italy and Netherlands on the 25th of March 1957 to sign the Treaty of Rome. Thus, the European Economic Community was officially formed, the main precursor of what we call today the European Union. The main goal was to restore a continent which had been ravaged by the horrors of the two world wars. A "common market" was meant to be created in order to promote the trade between the European countries, the following step being The European Coal and Steel Community which was founded in 1952. The United Kingdom did not become a member of the new founded union the main reasons being their strong desire to maintain their sovereignty, their unwillingness to adopt the common currency and the threat of being invaded by immigrants.

In this respect, Black (2021), in "A History of Britain – 1945 to Brexit", mentions the fact that Margaret Thatcher had always been against joining E.E.C. because she considered that the common coin was just the first step towards the political union. UK's economy started declining and this seemed to be the main reason why, in 1961, it applied to join the EU. Charles de Gaulle, then president of France, rejected UK's attempt to adhere the European project because he considered that UK's close connections with the United States would weaken the UK's devotion to the EU and called UK the trojan horse.

Clegg (2017) in "How to Stop Brexit (and make Britain Great Again)" considers that Britain decided to join the European Union because of "basic economic necessity" rather than ideology, hope or inspiration. In fact, when Britain eventually joined the European Economic Community (EEC), alongside with Ireland and Denmark, on the first of January 1973, *The Guardian* declared: "We're in- But Without Fireworks".

The U.K. was never entirely comfortable in the EU. As a matter of fact, its resistance to Europeanisation manifested in many ways while managing to secure a special status for itself: they did not join the eurozone, they were not part of the border-free Schengen Area, they did not sign up to all 130 of the European Union's Justice and Home Affairs laws. Only two countries decided not to adopt the single European currency and UK was one of them.

Despite Britain's controversial role in the European Union, over the last forty years Britain has played an important role in shaping its development and design.

2.2. Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom

"Euroscepticism" is a term first used in the British press at the mid-1980s, being initially associated with the term "anti-marketeer". Broadly speaking, the term may be defined as an opposition to the growing power of the European Union.

The phenomenon reached high levels during the premiership of Margaret Thatcher. Higazy (2020) argued in *Euroscepticism, Thatcherism and Brexit* that Margaret Thatcher's Euroscepticism in 1985-1990 was the starting point, the seed of the leave campaign and Brexit.

In 2009, Hogan was writing about the main fears of "Britain's so-called Eurosceptics as being the fact that strengthening alliances with Europe—by joining the European Union (EU), adopting a single currency, and adhering to laws and policies framed in Brussels rather than in Whitehall—will fundamentally alter the British way of life, dilute British culture, and undermine British national identity".

The British have never been terribly popular as a European member. They have always been the most hostile European people to the European Union norms and politics. In 1994, George considered Britain "an awkward partner", as a member of the European Union. Therefore, the UK's withdrawal from EU, after 47 years of membership, was not an entirely surprising decision.

Analysing the data provided by British Social Attitudes, mentioned by Richards, in his article published in *The Conversation*, entitled "British People Hardly Ever Thought about the EU before Brexit, Now it Dominates Their Lives", one thing is striking:

In 2015, only 22% wanted to leave the EU yet, as we know, 52% voted to leave in the referendum held the following year. This inflation of Europhobia, which provoked alarm among Remainers, was more or

less simultaneous with the rapid installation of Brexit as the major national issue.

The 2016 referendum, which was thought to have had strategic or political reasons as it was not meant to exit the EU but to renegotiate the terms of the UK's position in the European Union, divided the country into two groups: Eurosceptics vs. Europhiles, Brexiters vs. Remainers. Shipman (2016: 1041), in his work *All Out War: The Full Story of How Brexit Sank Britain's Political Class*, considered that the result of the referendum was nothing else but "the culmination of three decades of Euroscepticism cloaking a nation in its suffocating embrace".

2.2.1. Euroscepticism in England

One important aspect should be considered when discussing about Euroscepticism in England or even about pro-leave votes in England: the population of each of the component nations of UK which is distributed as follows: Northern Ireland 2.9 %, Wales 4.8%, Scotland 8.3 % and England 84%.

Considering that England had the highest number of Pro-Leave votes, it was the most Eurosceptic part of Britain and the English the most Eurosceptic national group. In analysing the results of the referendum in June 2016, it is obvious that there are some strikingly differentiated attitudes towards Europe, both within and between the different national territories of Britain. What is intriguing is that, in England, those with a more exclusively British sense of national identity are the most pro-European.

Darlington (2013), in "Euroscepticism in England is English not British", analysed the data from the *Future of England Survey* (FoES) conducted by the think tank IPPR and Cardiff and Edinburgh Universities, which emphasized the fact that "English believed they get a raw deal from membership of both the UK and the EU". Figure 2 is based on data from the 2012 *Future of England Survey* and shows how respondents would have voted if a referendum on EU membership had been held in November 2012. It is relevant in that it emphasizes the way in which the concept of Euroscepticism evolved over the past 10 years on UK's territory and it helps us to understand why the UK citizens have voted Leave in the 2016 Referendum.




Figure 2. *Vote in referendum on the UK's membership of the European Union by Moreno National Identity, England only, 2012 (%)*

Wyn Jones comments on the BPP multidisciplinary academic blog run by the London School of Economics and Political Science:

The extent of overall support in England for withdrawal is very striking. In fact, at this point (in November 2012) 50% of people in England would have voted to withdraw, 30% to remain member, with the remaining 20% divided between the Don't Knows and the Wouldn't Votes. It should be noted that more recent polling evidence suggests that this may have been a period of particularly strong Eurosceptic sentiment – but still...

This survey conducted in 2012 emphasizes the fact that Euroscepticism, in England, was already very strong at that time. Could the English have changed their minds? What could have changed from 2012 to 2016, when the referendum on whether UK should remain or leave the EU took place, actually took place? Nothing, as England was the country with the highest number of Pro-Brexit votes.

The Eurosceptic attitude is encountered especially among those inhabitants with a strong sense of English national identity. On the opposite side, those who possess a stronger sense of British national identity represent a group who makes up the smallest part of the English population, most supportive of the EU.

Some analysts make a connection between Englishness and Euroscepticism. "The Future of England" surveys published by the IPPR in 2012 and 2013 were among those who questioned this connection, arguing that the English were Eurosceptic, whereas the British were not. Among those who identified themselves as being British, not English, 45 percent believed that the European Union was a good partner, while among those who considered themselves as being English, not British, only 14 percent believed the EU membership was a good thing. By analysing the results of the referendum held in 2016 on Brexit, it can be easily noticed from the official numbers that the English were the most Eurosceptic of the UK's four nations. 53.38 of the population of England voted pro-Leave, the highest percent from all the four nations, followed by Wales with 52.53, Northern Ireland with 44.22 and Scotland with 38%.

The Brexit question offered people the increasingly scarce experience of being sure, clear, and together with others. In a world where it can be increasingly difficult to feel at home, and to know what we should be doing, this is a powerfully attractive experience – none the less so for being, in this case, illusory. This regressive surge into tribalistic unity of purpose was led by the Brexiteers. But Remainers have subscribed all-too readily to the melodramatic, self-fulfilling headlines that say Britain has plunged into a civil war.

3. Brexit

3.1. From the concept to the process

After the 2016 referendum, the UK decided to withdraw from the EU as softly as possible, doing its best to protect its citizens rights and to maintain the best relations with the European Union, considering that a large share of British economy was fuelled by laws and

agreements with the European countries. The whole process of UK's leaving the EU was called Brexit, a term coined by Peter Wilding when it added Brexit to its volumes, according to *The Oxford English Dictionary* ("Brexit" =uncountable noun used to refer to the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union). He wrote about "Brexit" in May 2012, eight months before the then Prime Minister David Cameron had announced he would be holding a referendum.

Troitino, Kerikmae and Chochia (2018), in "Brexit History, Reasoning and Perspectives", emphasized two main aspects which contributed to the already known results of the 2016 referendum in UK: on the one hand, regardless the age or social class, those who voted pro Leave were especially those who considered themselves as English rather than British; on the other hand, the UK citizens started feeling threatened by the large number of immigrants who accepted lower pay-outs and the social benefits that were meant to be just for the UK citizens had to be shared with the immigrants. An increasing feeling of anger and frustration was developing and the Leave campaign used it as the main reason why UK citizens should vote pro Brexit, although most of the immigrants were coming from non-EU countries.

The context in which the Brexit referendum took place should be considered. The UK citizens did not trust the European institutions and the Leave campaign used this background and fed the people's mistrust providing untrue information about UK's contributions to the EU budget, which had the result of an ill-founded choice from the voters. Getting to the bottom of how and why Brexit has become a fact will occupy social and political analysts for decades.

3.2. Brexiters vs. Remainers' resistance

The United Kingdom, the ruler of the history's largest empire, seemed to be disintegrating in the years before the referendum. The European Union itself seemed to be disintegrating even before the UK decided to leave it. It was not a process which happened over night.

The referendum held by the British Government in 2016 was advisory and the Brexiters had narrowly won. There were two options on the ballot paper of the referendum and UK citizens had to choose: remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union, simplifying an issue within a question. It was a blind choice as no realistic solutions were given in case UK decided to withdraw from EU and no long-term plans were revealed to the citizens.

David Cameron campaigned for the UK to remain a member of the EU. When the final results of the referendum were revealed, he decided to resign. The Remainers' resistance, after a bitterly close electoral race, had been tightly defeated. Although the British Remainers have created a pro-EU movement in Europe, mobilising hundreds of thousands to join street demos and millions more to sign anti-Brexit petitions, their efforts could not prevent a narrow 52-48% majority for Leave.

The results of the referendum and the resignation of the pro-European prime minister were two key events which swept away the Remainers' resistance. Yet, they did not capitulate and they fought to make Brexiters change their minds and prevent Brexit from actually taking place.

Nick Clegg (2017), Leader of the Liberal Democrats for eight years from 2007 and Deputy Prime Minister from 2010 to 2015, in *How to Stop Brexit and Make Britain Great Again*, even hoped to make Brexiters think twice about their decision. He claimed that the voters who ticked the "Leave" box had been lied and after having seen what Brexit meant they could change their minds. The book was written in 2017, a year after the EU referendum in UK, and the Remainers' resistance was still trying to change the course of events. Clegg's book is another attempt on the Remainers' side to make Brexiters reconsider their position as "the will of the people is not like a snapshot photo: once taken, never changed." (Clegg 2017: 136). Why wouldn't UK citizens have the right to change their minds regarding Brexit? Clegg (2017:138) concludes by saying that "In fact, Brexit does not have to mean Brexit at all."

Despite all these efforts made by the Remainers, Theresa May, the new Prime Minister of the UK, invoked Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union on 29 March 2017, which was the first step of UK's withdrawal from the European Union.




Figure 3: Results – UK Votes to Leave the EU (BBC 2022)

Yet, the citizens voted as mentioned in figure 3, and the dice were thrown. It can be easily noticed from the numbers in Figure 3, that two of the component countries of the UK voted Leave, England and Wales (53.38, respectively 52.53), while Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to remain in the European Union (62.38 respectively, 56%). It is a very complex matter, because UK consists of 4 four countries and all citizens have the same right to express their opinion and the civic right to vote. Taking into consideration these results, the discrepancies between the UK parts are obvious.

Many hypotheses were developed regarding the causes of such a result. Recent academic articles mention the importance of immigration, a phenomenon considered a key political issue in the decision Britain took in 2016. On the other hand, Hopkins considered Brexit to be the result of “the waves of nationalism”, an event following

the tendencies in the western democracies. In France, Marine Le Pen, the leader of the far-right Front National, predicted that 2017 would be the year in which the continental European peoples wake up, before she was defeated by Emmanuel Macron, a declared Europhile.

In UK, Britishness is a key factor as the citizens who strongly define themselves as being British voted pro Brexit even on territories with a Remain majority, for example, in Northern Ireland, which is not situated on the island of Great Britain. It is obvious that the pro-leave voters were undoubtedly opposed to globalisation, a phenomenon believed to be undermining traditions.

Former PM Boris Johnson's statement comes as a sort of link between all these ideas which seemed to have determined UK to vote Leave. The past, the identity and the nationalism are key concepts in his discourse comparing the EU to Nazi Germany "with different methods", according to Ross (2016). He appeals to the mass trauma about the English experience of the Second World War, developed by Stratton (2019) in his article "The Language of Leaving: Brexit, the Second World War and Cultural Trauma", published in *Journal for Cultural Research*, where he emphasizes the fact that:

The term Nazi continues to evoke fear and anxiety for Britons, and the English in particular. The cultural trauma that resulted from the fears evoked by Hitler's desire to invade and occupy the United Kingdom with the consequent loss of sovereignty, in the same way as the Nazis had invaded and occupied the countries of mainland Europe, still haunts those who identify as English. Consequently, Hitler and the Nazi project became a touchstone in the debates about Brexit both before and after the referendum.

Appealing to the past and all the emotional impact that it had on British mentality and collective consciousness was a very effective way of gaining both sympathy and credibility. Europe was felt as a serious threat to the well-being and security of the people in the immigrants

invading Europe and the terrorists' attacks, which had horrified people all over the world.

On the other hand, in poor areas of UK, the majority was pro-Brexit while in others, the Majority was for Remain. Goodwin and Heath (2016), call these groups of pro Leave voters, "left behind", people guided by pessimism, a sense of uncertainty and marginalisation. Yet, the mechanism by which education influenced one way or another voting for Brexit remains contested.

In England, the area with the most votes for remaining in the EU was London, the capital city. But the rest of England voted pro-Brexit because of the rising inequalities and negligence brought by immigration issues.

In UK, the population is distributed as follows: Northern Ireland 2.9 per cent, Wales 4.8 percent, Scotland 8.3 per cent and England 84 per cent, according to Jones (2017), in "Wales and the Brexit vote". Therefore, England is the most powerful part of the United Kingdom. English identity is shaped around the struggle for a better life, which according to English residents, was altered by joining the EU and migration issues.

The leave support from England was striking: a 7-point majority lead over the remain support. It is obvious that the support for the leave campaign came most predominantly from England compared to other regions of the UK such as Scotland that voted (62.0%–38.0%) in favour of remaining. This phenomenon has been argued by experts such as Henderson, Jeffery, Wincott, Wyn Jones, to be driven heavily by national identity in England that makes up 84% of the UK population and, therefore holds, the most sway over referendums that support the populous vote.

Conclusions

In their book, *A Past of Possibilities*, the French historians Deluermoz and Singaravélou (2021) examine the meaning and history

of “uchronias” – counterfactual histories and tales of “what could have been”. Such tales are everywhere in pop culture, but uchronia is not confined to fiction. The term is derived from utopia, a Greek neologism meaning both “no place” and “good place”. And like utopia, uchronia – swapping time for place – finds alternative worlds sprouting in the cracks of history.

Arguments about poor strategy or political misfortune always imply what could have been, from Jeremy Corbyn’s position on Brexit to Covid-19’s effect on the Trump presidency. Deluermoz and Singaravélou show that when done carefully, uchronian thinking – like utopian thinking – has offered not just a means of intellectual escape, or a resource of hope, but a way of asking serious questions about the past and present.

What if the Brexiters had been defeated by the Remainers in the referendum? What would have happened? What would have changed? Or would it have changed anything? Simply asking the question can help to dispel the odd sense of inevitability which has now settled on Brexit. The “awkward partner” was the first suspected and expected to withdraw from the European Union and it eventually did it.

Michel Barnier, the EU Chief Negotiator on Brexit, draws a conclusion in his diaries of Brexit, “My Secret Brexit Diary by Michel Barnier Review – a British Roasting” about Brexit’s impact and consequences:

There are lessons to be drawn from Brexit. There are reasons to listen to the popular feeling that expressed itself then and continues to express itself in many parts of Europe – and to respond to it. That is going to take time, respect and political courage.

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Crina-Oana Gociu

affiliation: the Faculty of Letters, "Vasile Alecsandri" University of Bacău,
Romania

position: PhD student

email: oanagociu3@gmail.com

research interests: identity studies, sociolinguistics

Selected publications:

(2022): *A Pragmatic Study of Jokes*, in *Ro-Brit- A Student Journal*, no. 14/2022, Editura Bacău: Alma Mater, pp. 42-47.

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Nadia-Nicoleta Morărașu

Understanding Brexit: Brexiters' Nationalism...

affiliation: the Faculty of Letters, "Vasile Alecsandri" University of Bacău, Romania

position: PhD Associate Professor

email: morarasu.nadia@ub.ro

research interests: identity studies, name studies, stylistics, phraseology

Selected publications:

(2020): *English-Romanian Dictionary of Name-related Terms/ Dicționar englez-român de termeni referitori la nume*, Cluj Napoca: Editura Casa Cărții de Știință.

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Mihaela Culea

affiliation: "Vasile Alecsandri" University of Bacău

position: PhD Associate Professor

email: culea.mihaela@ub.ro

research interests: English literature, cultural studies, discourse analysis

Selected publications:

(2021): "From Defoe to Coetzee Foe/'Foe' through Authorship" (Suciu, Andreia & Culea, Mihaela), in *Baltic Journal of English Language*,

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