

GLOBALIZATION

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Abstract: Globalization is, by all means, one of the most used words nowadays. One can find it in any person's vocabulary, it turns up in any debate. It exceeded long ago its initial meaning: the integration of the economic systems, promoted by the technological progress and by the multiplication of the commercial relations. It even came to ideological conflicts. But there are other more serious reasons: economy, the social life, culture, art, the religious life and the spirituality, the communication, the services – everything is continuously boiling. All the scaffolding on which the entire world order – still present – is based on tends to be blown up and replaced. How far can it go without dropping the situation out of hand? Is it a natural stage in the world's evolution scale? Is it a sign of progress or is it the last phase of the society before its collapse? Is it an inevitable phenomenon or a provoked and up kept one? Finally, all this waste of tumult can lead to some result?

Key words: globalization, information, graphical, global society

1. GLOBALIZATION. GENRAL FEATURES

“He who abandons freedom in favor of prosperity risks losing them both”, Benjamin Franklin.

The global society requires, among other things, extremely fast communication, and that gives the impression of a “global village” in which any small event is known of immediately by the dint of a caver in the corner of the street.

Indeed, the newest obsession seems to be that of information, of being informed. The whole world lets itself be drawn in a planetary media mechanism, overlooking the fact that information and communication aren't the same thing.

Thomas L. Friedman, one of the most important American analysts in the international business arena and winner of two Pulitzer prizes, makes a graphical assessment about the fundamental changes that occurred in the global communication age: “in the cold war period, weight was the measure for power, in the globalization age the measure of power is speed. Formerly, the question that mattered was: how big is your rocket? , tomorrow, that question will be: how fast is your modem?”

Still, in spite of the closest then ever approachment and the disappearing of the barriers as a result of the unprecedented speed transfer of the information, we find ourselves incapable of communicating emotions and deep spiritual states. We are able to talk at anytime to anybody from every corner of the world. Distances that once were covered in years, nowadays are covered in a few hours. Still, in stead of being easier to find a partner (no matter the purpose), solitude has become a serious social evil: for example, in USA, at the height of the “communication age”, over 26 million people are living alone.

The “spiritual” goal of globalization is the unification of all religions. Here is what Matthew Fox, the creator of the “profound ecumenism” concept, says: “The profound ecumenism is the movement that will capitalize the wisdom of all religions in the world: Hinduism, Buddhism, Islamism and Judaism, Taoism and Jingoism, Christianity in all its forms, inborn religions and gods religions in the entire world. The last hope of survival for this planet which we all can call home relies on the capitalization of this wisdom.”

The reasons for which the human of the global society (especially youngsters) accepts all kinds of pseudo-spiritual experiences, in the attempt of finding himself, are the tendencies to relativise the values and to modify the perception about the traditional (seen nowadays as old fashioned). Thus, young people lean towards either the syncretic religions, or (the ones with a higher rebellion potential) towards the luciferic doctrines, Satanism, esoterism. This kind of religion offers the believers a higher state of freedom by not forcing them to believe in a personal God. The believers can substitute themselves to the divinity and redemption becomes a problem that they can solve on their own, as they please.

According to Hegel, human life has two components: an immanent one, day to day, and a transcendental one, that is like a goal for the individual or for the group of people, above their limitation, generating the ethnic and national affiliation feeling. If one wants to kill this transcendental goal and transform the human being in a ferocious, egoistic individual, one has to modify the immanent component of his day to day life. This means the modification of the visual, auditory, tactile perceptions so as not to be able to feel anything else but this “overflow of the values”. This is the way the materialistic, telluric, without national consciousness, who lives only for himself to satisfy his own needs, human being is being created. Nothing matters, everything can be destroyed. Therefore, the traditional values mustn’t be destroyed, as the communist internationalism did, through force, because is not the external life of the individual that must be controlled but his way of thinking.

Anyone who wants to destroy a nation, to make it lose its identity, must first of all attack its culture and tradition: “To be able to subdue a nation, one has to completely annihilate its moral forces, thus deforming its past, backbiting his heroes and true leaders with the most infamous lies; you can achieve all this by using the most decayed and most unscrupulous elements, chosen from the rows of the nation in question, to lead it” – the wise Chinese Lao Tse wrote 2500 years ago.

True art always represented a universal language, a measure of the taste for beauty and of the power to communicate of the artist. It has a coherent manner of merging the idea with the way the idea is materialized. The authentic artistic goal is clearly built having easy to understand and to feel aims.

Unfortunately, by the end of the last millennium, art took some aberrant forms. The modification of the human relations, the overturn of values and the desire of “total emancipation” caused the brake between the artist and the creator and between this last one and his fellow creatures. The product that the art makers give nowadays is lacking more and more sensitivity and communication, is lacking new ideas and a formal order. Postmodern art, so fashionable in the global society, includes in its core a mix of all trends which exist on the international artistic scene: expressionism, surrealism, abstractionism, Dadaism, neoplasticism, hyperrealism, transvanguardism, minimalism, kabalism, happening, performance, informal art, kinetic art, body-art, pop-art, land-art, video-art.

2. NATIONAL IDENTITY AND GLOBALIZATION

No equation term is clear enough for us to be able to leave out some introductive annotations. In symbolic modern world geography, nation is described as a contradictory concept in any analysis of the modernity phenomenon. Fundamental antinomies and ambiguities accompany its chronotopic work in over two centuries since we are able to refer to a modern nation in a constitutional, political way as in France’s case, or in an organic, cultural way as in Germany’s case [1]. The two categories don’t deplete the rich and complex semantic of a nation, at the expense of which there already exists a wide literature [2].

If the end of the eighteenth century placed nation on the history’s orbit in both its meanings, the nineteenth century would unfold a wide nation molding process, being on the whole a nationalization century. It isn’t

surprising that the twentieth began with “proclamation” of the self determination principle and has known two big world wars caused by the same idea, and has finished, under our eyesight, having under discussion the entire national issue [3].

The end of the twentieth century has imposed a pluralistic vision in many areas, which coincided with the abolition of the communist system in Europe. Joseph Rothschild has published a political history of the Central – Eastern Europe in the last half of the century under the title “Return to diversity” [4]. But Europe itself, although it was in full integrative process, needed a plural way of organization [5], already used a quarter of a century before [6]. Its identity was being drawn in concentric circles, its integration was being planned at different rates [7].

Nevertheless, the opposition between east and west was essential, persistent, in spite of the integrative speech used by the European unification strategists. What Jacques Bainville noticed in 1920, by studying the consequences of the just finished war, remains still up to date[8]. As it was then, the force represented by the eastern “bloc” has been pulverized, old rivalry and a dangerous political instability reappearing. It has become clear again that often nationality prevails above nation. The nation is a geohistoric product consisting in culture, habits, cutume, common memories, namely a series of elements which ensures some stability in the reactions and interests. With this idea in mind, the Eastern Europe still has important weaknesses.

Such opinions, extended over a whole century of political convulsions, recommends actually the reference of the nation to an average duration, as some historians are already accustomed to do, or even to a long duration, if we recall the braudelien, “Identite de la France” [9]. From the most rigorous studies, it results that the nation mustn’t be considered an irrevocable, immutable reality that the historian can circumscribe once and for all at the expense of a biological determinism, such as in an “insectarium” from the entomology arsenal, but as an organic and complex reality, one in permanent change of course.

Ernest Renan has already warned us over a century ago about this way of defining the etno cultural entities, when he said that “the nation is a everyday plebiscite”, an optional reality that is always being rebuilt [10]. This is the meaning from which a whole exegesis on the national phenomena is being claimed, since Georges Sorel and Max Weber up to the postmodern studies, with variable accents, but having as a constant feature the respect for everyone’s desire to assume a collective identity [11].

A frequent paradox in history sometimes transforms a profitable idea in its time into a fatal one in another time. It is known that the national idea has conducted to the formation of the modern states, in the nineteenth century, but has become harmful in the twentieth century because of the excess in the idea. Its supporters and negators seem equally determined, and also equally persuasive. A devotee of an open society, redoubtable militant against any kind of exclusivism, advised us not long ago to keep in mind that the “nationalism is two faced”: a “benign, cultural, in search of a phrasal form”, in line with other nationalities aspirations one, as it was in 1848; “the other is primitive, violent, pointed against other nationalities, the civil wars are based on this one”. The first one is harmonized with the open society philosophy, and the second one, contrary, stimulates isolation [12]. The relation between these two isn’t easy to be found, even where the democratic system is well defined and more stable.

The western world seemed surprised by the proportion of the nationalistic demonstrations from the former soviet camp. What did all the nations from the former soviet camp want? Their self determination, independence and sovereignty claims risked transforming the whole region into chaos, when everything around was falling down, and the power gap in such a wide area was stimulating the political adventure, improvisation, terrorism.

The nationalist motions in Central – Eastern Europe seem to be directly related to the economical crisis, to poverty and also to the interest of the former “leading class” to stop reforms and to block the democratization process [13]. The accent of the ethnic dimension sometimes has a destiny aspect, feeding a self justifying speech, and even a project to subjugate others. Against this tendency there isn’t anything more suitable than the “polyphonic unity” of the continent, one therefore excluding the “melting pot” strategy recommended by some strategists [14] of the European Unification or of globalization [15].

The essential problem that nowadays Europe is concerned with is the way of articulating the integrative will (from the economical and political point of view) considering its cultural diversity. Some people, for good reasons, tend to consider the first aspect as having a decisive meaning. Other people consider themselves entitled to emphasize on the cultural factor, with its “*a la longue*” action difficult to circumscribe. “The Europe of the nations was being born as the Europe of the empires was being unraveled. Subsequently, in the twentieth century, the national order of the states and cultures has been generalized, becoming the organizational pattern for the world’s political map, the frame of reference which the adventure of modernity has unfolded in” [16].

Nation, culture, identity – here is a triad always in question, even in other sequence, because one can begin with the identity problem issue and can reach culture and nation, and also one can consider culture the point of departure to be able to investigate the national identity. The question that lasts in our mind is whether the integration logic will prevail over the differentiation logic, whether the people of tomorrow will finally respect the work of time. A Romanian scientist of certain notoriety, Dimitrie Gusti, good expert in the area, noticed in its time: “Nation is the only social unity that is self sufficient, meaning that it doesn’t require for its full accomplishment a stronger social unity, being able to create its own world of values, to establish its own aim and to find out its own ways of achievement, that being its own manner of organization and advancement. No other social unity takes a similar place in the social life field” [17]. One can only subscribe to this conclusion, taking into consideration the author’s knowledge, a fine sociologist and cultural philosopher, and the fact that since then “the science of the nation” has added enough similar arguments.

It is clear that the nationalistic feeling has been an important factor in the falling of the soviet system. Although it was a justified reaction to an standardizing, destructive, annihilatory system, this feeling tended to become nationalism and because of that an obstacle for democracy. Helene Carrare d’Encausse, among other analysts, has warned us about this a long time ago [18]. Seen as a product of the foreign domination, the communist system had the destiny of the empire that imposed it after the last world war. The troubled waters here and there lead to the disappearance of the system itself, in spite of any stability illusions [19].

Not many analysts were able to contemplate on the scale of this phenomenon. History is, of course, surprising. One can say that pluralism was its own destructive mark. From the Balkans to the Central Asia, the former communists have sabotaged the democratic reforms and used nationalistic scenarios to cultivate confusion, disappointment, not to be able to easily manipulate different social groups. Such a trend was supposed to be used by the “new order” strategists, thinking that its acceptance would be good for the stability of the democracy [20].

Eastern Europe’s nationalism brings about a series of unpleasant memories: wars, ethnic tensions, intolerance. This shows a certain difficulty of the nations in the region to accept one another and also an excessive specificity. All this is related to the ethnic groups, frontiers, the soviet domination’s consequences, the nationalist rhetoric of apparatus, used namely to divide and govern, and also the almost perpetual contradiction between a quasi elevated intellectual speech and the political incapacity.

The dominoes theory has shown in the last years of the twentieth century the national unsettlement in what once was the eastern “block”. While the system was falling down into the mother country and the satellite countries, the old national background was being reactivated, placing the solution search on the second place and postponing them in excess. A good expert in the matter, Jacques Rupnik suggested that the new evolutions in the area be cleared by using the “spring of the nations” theory from the half of the nineteenth century, when all the Central – Eastern Europe problems’ had shown up, problems that exist nowadays too. The Habsburgic empire couldn’t solve them, the period between the two world wars was too short for the solutions to be found, and the soviet domination after the last world war only made matters more complicated, creating the impression that it had solved all the conflicts when in fact it only suspended them over a period of time using a “cryogenical” technique. The post communist evolutions show that the background, the synthesis produced in time cannot simply be ignored, and that a long, tumultuous and dramatic history can’t be unaccounted for the sake of a diplomatic structure [21].

History doesn’t respect what is gained disregarding time. The simplifications brought by the “correct thinking” didn’t remain unnoticed in what nation is concerned, a too complex matter to be reduced to a rational scheme.

Richard Rorty, at the peak of the deterioration period, was advising his fellow countrymen not to forget that the moderate national pride is still a sign of implacable identity and that the alternative, excessive simulating the differences, has a centrifugal and dissolving meaning [22].

No matter how profitable the damper imposed by the civic patriotism idea was, it doesn't eliminate the ethnical background, as one could easily see, not long ago, in the Boston Review, when a debate on this issue was taking place [23], debate that mixed together, as it has been said, the stoical inspiration, the enlightening democracy and a continuous humanistic opening [24]. Even before that, an ethno-cultural "revival" has been notice when thinking about the western world, not without an anxiety felling, because it was contradictory to the theme of globalization [25].

A middle speech is being already built as a reaction to the ethno centered and cosmopolitan excesses, because of the pressure of an evolution that imposed in the last years a long term clarification. It rejects both the native denial of the western and the servile imitation of the laws in question [26]. What characterizes this speech is the constant preoccupation to reconcile the local traditions and the ideas enforced by the Euro-Atlantic integration logic. The recent debates have underlined the preoccupation of some member or candidates to the European Union states to protect their own values, for the communitary expectancies not to encroach upon the national specificity [27]. It is acknowledged now that "against the nationalism and its mental derivatives it is necessary to create an integrative and pedagogical ideology" [28].

The pluralism, as vision, is far from finishing its resources when speaking about the nation, the ethno-cultural identity, globalization, multidimensional phenomena. All those can't be considered out of history.

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